5.
This trend works to eliminate all but one newspaper in towns of less than 50,000 population, to combine two papers under one publisher in cities of 50,000 to 400,000 and to maintain competition only in cities of more than 400,000 population. Ibid.
The distribution of daily newspaper competition by cities as of Janaury 6. In 1949, 378 of the 1,311 communities possessing broadcasting facilities had competing stations. Communication to the YALE LAWv JOURNAL from T. J. Slowie, Secretary, FCC, dated December 7, 1949 in Yale Law Library. These communities had Z179 standard (AM) stations and 865 frequency modulation (FM) stations. The overwhelming majority of commercial FM stations were authorized to All licensees and were jointly operated, so that programs broadcast over the AM stations were transmitted simultaneously by the FM station. 15 FCC AxN. REP. 40, 53 (1950) .
In 1948, 356 communities had competing stations. Of these, 156 had two stations, 87 had three and 133 had four or more. In the Matter of Editorialidng By Broadcast Licensees, communities with dailies also have at least one radio station.' But 407 of the radio stations are affiliated with local newspapers," and there are 170 "one-to-one" cities where the only radio station is affiliated with the only newspaper. 9 With such a limited number of mass media, these markets bear scant resemblance to the ideal of "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" within a community. 10 Application of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice is one possible remedy for the restrictions imposed by cross-channel ownership. 1 Antitrust law would compel divestiture if absorption of a radio station was 7. At least one newspaper and one radio station exist in 989 communities. Data compiled from BROADCASTING MAGAZINE YEAioox 69-325 (1950) 20 (1945) . It has been said that the paucity of local media is overcome by the number of available outside media: stations located in nearby towns; regional and clear-channel stations; and newspapers. But these media do not fulfil the same function as local media. Since each community has peculiar local problems which are of little concern to outside media, there must be diversification on the local level just as there must be diversity on the regional and national level. See dissent in Stephen R. Rintoul, 3 PixE & FiSCHER RADIO REG, 96, 99 (1945) (Commission approved transfer of only local radio station to only local daily where the community was serviced by a number of media originating in an out-of-state metropolitan area). See also Editor & Publisher, Dec. 31, 1938, p. 20 RE(, 694 (1947) . Accord, Huntington Broadcasting Co., 5 PiKE & FisciiE RADIO REa. 721 (1950) .
OFFIcIAL iREPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGs BFXORE THE FEDERAL COmnUNICATIONS
11. The Communications Act specifically provides that the granting of a license shall not estop the United States from proceeding against the licensee for violation of the antitrust laws. Communications Act § 311.
lVol. 59
NOTES the result of coercive tactics on the part of a newspaper, or if joint ownership was used to exclude disfavored advertisers or to sell them time and space only at unduly high rates.
12 Generally speaking, divestiture is also in order where joint ownership carries with it the power to exclude actual or potential competitors, or where its dominance is such as to deprive consumers of any real alternatives. But it is at least doubtful that mere common ownership of a radio station and newspaper in a single town would violate the antitrust laws.' 4 It is even more doubtful that common ownership of two out of three or four media would constitute a violation, even though the public interest in diversity of news sources is to a considerable extent compromised.
Practical considerations also weigh heavily against undue reliance on this means of enforcement. The funds available to the Antitrust Division are likely to remain meagre in relation to the job assigned to it. 14. The Supreme Court has defined the area of the market wherein control is alleged as the zone of immediate competition for the product. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (market for sugar beets in a small area in northern California); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (market for rolled steel in an eleven-state area) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (taxi-cab market in Chicago).
It might be argued that.in the communication field the product is local news and the market is the community. But compare the followving statement: "Anyone who owns and operates the single theater in a town, or acquires the exclusive right to exhibit a film, has a monopoly in the popular sense. But he usually does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless he has acquired or maintained his strategic position, or sought to expand his monopoly, or expanded it by means of those restraints of trade which are cognizable under § 1." United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948) .
15. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has never been equal to the task of policing the entire economy. Before 1939, its staff never included more than 60 lawyers; today, it has no more than 200. And not until 1940 did. it ever receive an appropriation of $1,000,000. Limitations of personnel alone have made it impossible to continue beyond the investigation stage every inquiry disclosing practices which are questionable under the federal antitrust laws. A careful process of selection forces the Division to consider the advantage that will be secured if the action is successful and the effect of such action on future antitrust law enforcement See NVWLroN HamiLTo.,;, PArzxTcs or ComsPErrrIoN 59 (1940) 
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national monopoly is involved, the Division necessarily tends to tackle only selected offenders rather than an entire industry. 16 It would be virtually impossible to effect a uniform policy on cross-channel ownership by such procedures. Moreover, it seems undesirable to divert the energies of the Antitrust Division from the vast unregulated areas of the economy into a field already subject to supervision by another federal administrative agency.
Administration action by the Federal Communications Commission, therefore, is a more promising answer to the problems presented by newspaper-radio mergers. The FCC is empowered to grant, renew or revoke broadcasting licenses. 17 In exercising that power, it is confined by a statutory guide no less broad than the "public interest." 18 And ever since the Renewal proceedings furnish the FCC with an opportunity to submit the licensee's operation of the station to a comprehensive evaluation. In the case of AM stations, this opportunity occurs once every three years. 47 CoDE FED. REgs. § 3.34 (1949) . FM licenses are granted for a lesser period. Id., § 3.218. While the Commission can terminate the franchise at any time during its life, it has been chary in the use of this power, having utilized it only twice in 23 years. Station WSAL, 8 FCC 34 (1940) ; Station KPAB, 5 Pin. & FiscHER RADIO REG. 1297 (1950 . See Note, 15 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (1940) . The major difference between denial and revocation proceedings lies in the placing of the burden of proof that station operation will be in the public interest. In the latter, unlike refusals to renew, the Commission must show that operation is not in the public interest. See WARNER, RADIO AND TasiLvXSoN LAW § 12(g), (1948) . Abandonment of the principle of restraining government action in matters involving the press resulted from the singular nature of the broadcasting medium. Only in radio is the number of available channels subject to physical limitation. Even today, despite the three- In a recent case, Mansfield Journal v. FCC, 21 the Commission has for the first time denied a broadcasting license to a newspaper on antitrust grounds. Upon investigation and hearing, the Commission found that the Journal, Mansfield's only newspaper, had sought to suppress competition in the dissemination of news and to achieve an advertising monopoly by attempting to drive out the only other local mass medium-radio station WMAN. Because these past practices presaged future abuse, the Journal's application was denied.
2 2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia approved both the ruling and the grounds on which the ruling was made.
23
But more important, the court indicated that the Commission in the exercise of its licensing power could look to a much broader range of considerations than the unseemly behavior apparently indulged in by the applicant in the Mansfield case. The decision not only implied that a license fold increase in commercial broadcasting stations since 1945, the number of qualified applicants exceeds the number of available franchises.
FCC ANN. REP. 36 (1950).
19. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943) . 20. "A licensee charged with practices in contravention of this standard cannot continue to hold his license merely because his conduct is also in violation of the antitrust laws and he has not yet been proceeded against and convicted. By clarifying in Section 311 the scope of the Commission's authority in dealing with persons convicted of violating the antitrust laws, Congress can hardly be deemed to have limited the concept of 'public interest' so as to exclude all considerations relating to monopoly and unreasonable restraints upon commerce. Nothing in the provisions or history of the Act lends support to the inference that the Commission was denied the power to refuse a license to a station not operating in the public interest merely because its misconduct happened to be an unconvicted violation of the antitrust laws." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 223 (1943) .
Earlier, the Commission, relying upon Section 313, had said: "The prohibitions of the Sherman Act apply to broadcasting. This Commission, although not charged with the duty of enforcing that law should administer its regulatory powers with respect to broadcasting in the light of the purposes which the Sherman Act was designed to achieve." FCC, REPoRT oN CHAIN BROADCASTING 46 (1941) . The FCC has also taken official notice of the policies of the Sherman Act when regulating the telephone and telegraph industries under the grant of power contained in 22. The components of the Commission's decision are inextricably entangled. The Commission referred to its determination that diversification of the control of mass media was desirable; applicant's past record; and the possibility that applicant would extend his present course of action into the future if the application were granted. Whether the decision that the grant would not be in the public interest rests on the past practices or applicant's probable future operation of the station is not clearly stated. Most probably, it rests on both. could be denied if the grant would help achieve a monopoly; 24 it also sustained the Commission's power to consider monopolistic practices of the applicant whether or not they would constitute violations of the antitrust laws. 25 It seems probable, therefore, that where appropriate the Commission can deny or revoke a license on a showing, without more, that common ownership will operate or has operated to reduce the diversity of news sources which "public interest" requires.
So far, the power has not become a practice,2 1 though in recent competitive hearings the FCC has favored non-newspaper applicants." Rather, analysis of cases since the Stamford decision 2s of 1945 indicates that the Commission's primary considerations in licensing are the degree of identification of the applicant with the community to be served; the probability that those in control will devote their full efforts to the station; the extent of previous experience in radio, particularly within the community involved; and the scope of the proposed service.
2 " Apparently the issue of joint ownership is controlling only when scrutiny of these factors has failed to produce a decision.
30
Since its power to incorporate the spirit as well as the letter of antitrust law into its regulation is now firmly established, the Commission should turn the Mansfield approach into a continuing policy. Wise administration might call initially for a rule which would in substance forbid newspaper ownership of radio stations where the effect would be to create a monopoly or substantially to lessen competition in the mass dissemination of news.31 24. Id. at 33, 34. The court cites with approval that section of the Chain Broadcasting Report which asserts the power of the Commission "to refuse licenses or renewals to any person who engages or proposes to engage in practices which will prevent either himself or other licensees from making the fullest use of radio facilities." (emphasis added). FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 83 (1941 624 (1946) . Cf. Midland Broadcasting Co., 3 PIKE & FIScHER RADIO REG. 1961 REG. (1948 .
There have been no attempts at dissolution for this cause since the investigation of newspaper ownership began in 1941. For the inconclusive statement of policy issued after the conclusion of the hearings, see 9 FED. REG. 702 (1944 If the order is no more than a general statement of policy, it may not be subject to prior judicial review. Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 STAT. 219, 220 as incorporated and extended by Communications Act § 402(b). Where the order sought to be reviewed does not of itself adversely affect complainant, but will only affect him if the agency uses it as a basis for action against him, resort to the courts is either premature or wholly beyond their province. Rochester Telephone Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939) . But see Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) .
These requirements will make it virtually impossible to secure review before the Commission acts on an application for renewal since the FCC has refused to issue declaratory judgments under the power granted it by § 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1946) . See Cross-out Advertising Co., 5 Pxxr & Fiscnu RADIO REG. 464 (1949) .
The promulgation of rules would not only serve as an indication of the Commission's stand on the matter, but would also allow the industry a chance to present its side of the controversy. The right of interested persons to adequate notice and hearing is guaranteed in rule-making proceedings. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 ST. T. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(d) (1946) . These rights only apply to "substantive rules, which invoke true administrative legislation." SEN. Dc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946) . In all probability, the proposed rule would bear a substantive tag. Nathanson, Some Comns,.ts on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. Ray. 363, 382 (1946) .
33. Communications Act § 309(a). This section not only gives the Commission authority to grant licenses without a hearing, but it also enables a license applicant to request a hearing as of right before his license is denied. Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U. S. 327 (1945) .
34. Licensees have always been extremely jittery when dealing with the Commission. In the back of their minds is the omnipresent threat of license revocation. Accordingly, rules and even informal utterances by the FCC or its individual members have often been followed instantly by conformance to the new pattern. See Comment, Administrat've Enforcement of the Lottery Broadcast Provision, 58 YM.a L. J. 1093. 1110 (1949) . But compare the action of the industry when faced with the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. Wurni, THE AmEmcAx RADio 162 (1947).
paper applicant, the power may be exercised through original denial of a license, or through revocation or refusal to renew. Depending on the case, withholding of a license may be based on one of three grounds. First, monopolistic practices engaged in by the applicant in the past may be chalked up as a poor character qualification.
5 Second, the Commission may find that cross-channel ownership has violated or is likely to violate the antitrust prohibition against monopoly power. Third, the Comn'ission may find that such ownership, while not violating antitrust law, is nevertheless inconsistent with the "public interest" in getting as much diversity as is possible."
In some cases, joint ownership of a newspaper and radio station will not be contrary to the public interest. Small communities, where the need to promote diversity may be the greatest, often possess insufficient resources to support competing information outlets." Enforcing competition here, without regard to economic consequences, might only destroy one or both media."' And perhaps in some large cities sources of information may be so numerous that the effect of occasional cross-channel ownership may be inconsequential.
A thorough but flexible application of the Mansfield doctrine would contribute substantially to the public's interest in widely diversified control over the instruments of mass communication. (1942) . Here, the Court set aside an NLRB order issued without Board consideration of a relevant criminal statute. ". . . [T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so singlemindedly that it may holly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently, the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task." Id. at 47.
36.
If the Commission is to carry out the program contemplated herein, it should have some means at its command to allow the licensee a period of grace before the franchise is discontinued. Issuance of a cease and desist order would enable the licensee to secure a purchaser before final proceedings to cancel the license were instituted. The FCC has requested Congress to provide it with the power to issue cease and desist orders. See Hear.
ings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 1973 § 312(b), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1949) .
37. 
